

Firstname :
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Possible Correction .

Please be concise and precise. All documents are allowed. Electronic devices are not allowed.

Duration : 30min.

We want to compute the optimal strategy of a gambler. Initially, the gambler starts with $S_0 \in \{1, \dots, 4\}$ euros. At each time step, he/she can bet up to S_t euros (bets are integer between 0 and S_t).

If the gambler bets A_t , then with probability $p \in (0, 1)$, he/she wins $2A_t$ and with probability $q = 1 - p$, the gambler loses A_t :

$$S_{t+1} = \begin{cases} S_t + 2A_t & \text{with probability } p \\ S_t - A_t & \text{with probability } q = 1 - p \end{cases}$$

1. We assume that the gambler wants to maximize the probability of reaching $S_t \geq 5$ euros within T bets. Explain why this can be modeled as a MDP and provide the state space, action space, reward and transition probabilities. Shall we use a finite-horizon or a discounted reward criterion?

We consider a MDP with state space $S = \{0, 1, 2, 3, 4, \geq 5\}$. The state represents the amount of money that we have. Actions allowed in state s are $\{0, 1, \dots, s\}$. The reward is 1 for the state " ≥ 5 " at time T .

The transitions probabilities are:

$$P(s'|s, 0) = 1 \quad (\text{if we bid } 0)$$

$$P(s+2a|s, a) = p \quad \text{if we bid } a > 0$$

$$P(s-a|s, a) = 1-p$$

We consider a finite horizon problem.

2. Let $V_t(s)$ be the probability that the gambler ends with 5 or more euros given that he/she started with s euros after t bets. We set $V_T(5) = 1$ and $V_T(s) = 0$ for $s < 5$. Write below a set of equations that link the values of $V_t(s)$, $V_{t+1}(s')$, p and q (for $t < T$):

- $V_t(0) = 0$

- $V_t(1) = \max(V_{t+1}(1), pV_{t+1}(3) + (1-p)V_{t+1}(0)) = pV_{t+1}(3)$

- $V_t(2) = \max(V_{t+1}(2), pV_{t+1}(4) + (1-p)V_{t+1}(1), pV_{t+1}(\geq 5) + (1-p)V_{t+1}(0)) = 0$

- $V_t(3) = \max(V_{t+1}(3), pV_{t+1}(5) + (1-p)V_{t+1}(2), pV_{t+1}(\geq 5) + (1-p)V_{t+1}(1), pV_{t+1}(\geq 5))$

- $V_t(4) = \max(V_{t+1}(4), pV_{t+1}(\geq 5) + (1-p)V_{t+1}(3), pV_{t+1}(\geq 5) + (1-p)V_{t+1}(2), \dots)$

- $V_t(5) = 1$

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this is longer than this except maybe for "2"

3. Assume that $T = 1$. Compute the optimal strategy and its expected performance.

We apply the above equation and we get:
 $V_0(0) = V_0(1) = 0$; $V_0(2) = V_0(3) = V_0(4) = p$; $V_0(5) = 1$.

The optimal strategy is to bid "2" in state 2, 3, 4 and 0 in state 1, 0; 1; 5. There are other optimal strategies.

4. Assume that $T = 4$ and $p = 1/2$. Complete the following table of $V_t(s)$ (justify below).

V	$t = 0$	$t = 1$	$t = 2$	$t = 3$	$t = T = 4$
$s = 0$	$V_0(0) = 0$	0	0	0	0
$s = 1$	$3/8$	$3/8$	$1/4$	0	0
$s = 2$	$5/8$	$1/2$	$1/2$	$1/2$	0
$s = 3$	$3/4$	$3/4$	$3/4$	$1/2$	0
$s = 4$	$7/8$	$7/8$	$3/4$	$1/2$	0
$s = 5$	1	1	1	$\frac{1}{2}$	1

$$V_1(2) = \max\left(\frac{1}{2} \times 1, \frac{1}{2} \times \left(\frac{3}{8} + \frac{1}{8}\right)\right) = \frac{1}{2}$$

$$V_1(3) = \frac{1}{2} \left(1 + \frac{1}{2}\right); V_1(4) = \frac{1}{2} \left(1 + \frac{3}{8}\right)$$

$$V_0(2) = \max\left(\frac{1}{2}; \frac{1}{2} \left(\frac{7}{8} + \frac{3}{8}\right)\right) = \frac{5}{8}$$

$$V_0(3) = \frac{1}{2} \left(1 + \frac{1}{2}\right); V_0(4) = \frac{1}{2} \left(1 + \frac{3}{8}\right) = \frac{7}{8}$$

5. Describe the optimal strategy (for $p = 1/2$).

The optimal strategy is to bid "1" in almost all cases except for $t = \{2, 3\}$ and $s = 2$ where it is optimal to bid "2".

For $t = 1$ and $s = 2$, actions bid = 1 and bid = 2 are both optimal.