Sizing, Incentives and Regulations in Bike-sharing Systems

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1. joint work with Christine Fricker (Inria)

Outline



2 Detailed study of the homogeneous case

- **3** Adding some Heterogeneity
- 4 Current and future work

A new transportation system.

- Bike sharing systems started in the 60s.
- Increasing popularity. Ex : Velib' in Paris (2007).
- $\bullet\,>$ 400 cities (and counting). Ex : Barcelona, Montreal, Washington.



Map of Velib' stations in Paris (France).

Example of Velib' :

- 20000 bikes
- 1500 stations.

Usage :

- Take a bike from any station.
- Use it.
- Return it to a station of your choice.

Public but different from public transportation

Many advantages :

- Good for the town (pollution, traffic jams, health);
- Good for the citizen (not to buy, to park the bike, no risk of theft).

However : congestions problems due to flows and random choices.



Introduction and model

Homogeneous case

Heterogeneous case

How to manage them?

- Sizing : number of stations? bikes? locations for bikes per station?
- performance : a low number of problematic stations
 - low number of empty or full stations
- time dependent arrival rate : daily period
- heterogeneity : popular or non popular stations (housing and working areas, uphill and downhill stations,...)

Our approach : study the impact of random choices

- Qualitative behavior and quantitative impact of different factors.
- **2** Strategies : redistribution (trucks) and incentives (pricing).

Related work :

- Traces analysis (Borgnat et al. 10, Vogel et al. 11, Nair et al. 11]
- Redistribution based of forcast [Raviv et al. 11, Chemla et al. 09]
- Few stochastic models. In a similar context : limiting regime with infinite capacity [Malyshev Yakovlev 96, Georges Xia 10]

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C = 4

$$C = 4$$

For all N stations :

• Fixed capacity C

Will be extended to non-homogeneous :

• arrival rate, routing probability

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For all N stations :

- Fixed capacity C
- Arrival rate λ .

Will be extended to non-homogeneous :

• arrival rate, routing probability

C = 4



For all N stations :

- Fixed capacity C
- Arrival rate λ .
- Routing matrix : homogeneous.
- Travel time : exponential of mean 1/µ.

Will be extended to non-homogeneous :

• arrival rate, routing probability

C = 4



For all N stations :

- Fixed capacity C
- Arrival rate λ .
- Routing matrix : homogeneous.
- Travel time : exponential of mean $1/\mu$.
- Other destination chosen if full (\approx local search).

Will be extended to non-homogeneous :

arrival rate, routing probability

A first result : distribution of stations

We focus on the distribution of occupancy in steady state.

Theorem

There exists ρ , such that in steady state, as N goes to infinity :

$$x_i = \frac{1}{N} \# \{ \text{stations with i bikes} \} \propto \rho^i.$$

We have $\rho \leq 1$ iff $s \leq \frac{C}{2} + \frac{\lambda}{\mu}$ where s be the average number of bikes per stations.



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Proof based on mean field approximation

$$x_i = \frac{1}{N} \# \{ \text{stations with i bikes} \}$$



For fixed N, X_i is a complicated stochastic process

 Reversible process but steady state not explicit.

Proof based on mean field approximation

$$x_i = \frac{1}{N} \# \{ \text{stations with i bikes} \} \propto \rho^i$$







 Reversible process but steady state not explicit. System described by an ODE

0.6

1 packets 2 packets

- The ODE has a unique fixed point.
- Closed-form formula.

Use mean field approximation [Kurtz 79]

• Study the system when the number of stations N goes to infinity.

Consequences

Proportion of problematic stations (=empty+full) x_0+x_C is minimal for

$$ho = 1$$
 i.e. $s = s_c \stackrel{def}{=} \lambda/\mu + C/2$

• Prop. of problematic stations is at least 2/(C+1) and "flat" at s_c .

Ex : for C = 30 : at least 6.5% of problematic stations.



y-axis : Prop. of problematic stations. x-axis : number of bikes/station s.

A first rule : "two choices" rule.

Users can observe the occupation of stations.

• Rule : choose the least loaded among 2 stations close to destination to return the bike.

Paradigm known as "the power of two choices" :

- Used in balls and bills [Azar et al. 94]
- Supermarket model, server farm [Vvedenskaya 96, Mitzenmacher 96]

Characteristics of bike-sharing systems :

- Finite capacity of stations.
- 2 Local search (choice among neighbors).

Two choices – finite capacity but no geometry

With no geometry, we can solve in close-form.

• Proof uses similar mean field argument.



Choosing two stations at random, improves perf. from 1/C to 2^{-C}

Two choices – taking geometry into acount

Problem hard to solve : mean field do not apply (geometry) :(.

- Existing results for balls and bins (see [Kenthapadi et al. 06])
- Only numerical results exists for server farms (ex : [Mitzenmacher 96])



We rely on simulation

Occupancy of stations x-axis = occupation of station. y-axis : proportion of stations.

Recall : with no incentives, the distribution would be uniform.

Empirically :

 with geometry 2D : proportion of problematic stations is ≈ 2^{-C/2}. (recall : with no-geometry : 2^{-C}, with no incentive : 1/C).



Same model as before with a truck



Same model as before with a truck

With rate $\gamma\cdot\lambda$:

- Take a bike from the most loaded.
- Put it in the least loaded.

Question : what should be γ ? 10%, 20%, more ?



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Optimal rate of regulation

Recall C is the capacity, s the fleet size and N the number of stations.

Theorem

As N goes to infinity, we have :

• The number of problematic stations decreases as γ increases.

• If $\gamma > \frac{1}{2[C-(s-\lambda/\mu)]-1}$, then there is no problematic stations.

For example : if $s = \frac{C}{2} + \frac{\lambda}{\mu}$, a regulation rate of 1/(C-1) suffices.

Proof. Again mean field approximation but with discontinuous dynamics

• The dynamical system is described by a differential inclusion

$$\dot{x} \in F(x).$$

• The DI has a unique solution. We can solve in close-form. See [Gast Gaujal 2010].

Optimal rate of regulation, illustration

Example : capacity is C = 10. Fleet size is 3,5 or 7 bikes/stations.



Regulation (
$$\gamma=10\%$$
).







x-axis = occupancy of stations, from 0 to 10. y-axis = proportion of stations.

Conclusion on the homogeneous model

		prop. of problematic stations	ex : <i>N</i> = 30
Original model		1/C	6.5%
Two choices	(random)	2 ^{-C}	$10^{-9}pprox 0$
	(geom)	2 ^{-C/2}	$10^{-4.5}$
Regulation	$\gamma > \frac{1}{C-1}$	0	$\gamma = .032$

However : as mentioned before, there are some important factor :

- time dependent arrival rate : daily period
- heterogeneity : popular or non popular stations (housing and working areas, uphill and downhill stations,...)

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Heterogeneous model

For each station i:

• Fixed capacity C_i

$$C_1 = 5$$

Heterogeneous model



For each station i:

- Fixed capacity C_i
- Arrival rate λ_i .

Heterogeneous model



For each station i:

- Fixed capacity C_i
- Arrival rate λ_i .
- Popularity of station *P*.
- Travel time : exponential of mean $1/\mu_{ij}$.
- Local search if full.

Steady state performance

There are N stations. Assume that as N goes to infinity, the popularity of the parameters $p_i = (\lambda_i, p_i)$ goes to some distribution.

Theorem (Propagation of chaos-like result)

There exists a function $\rho(p)$ such that for all k, if stations $1, \ldots k$ have parameter $p_1, \ldots p_k$, then, as N goes to infinity :

$$P(\#\{\text{bikes in stations j}\} = i_j \text{ for } j = 1..k) \propto \prod_{j=1}^k \rho(p_j)^{i_j}$$

Depending on popularity, stations have different behaviors : Popular start \rightarrow Popular of Popular









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Steady-state performance : numerical example

- In general, ρ is the solution of a fixed-point equation.
- Can be plotted in closed form for particular cases.



Figure: Two types of stations : popular and non-popular for arrivals : $\lambda_1/\lambda_2 = 2$.

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Current and future work

Good understanding of the symmetric model

- Performance poor : 1/C problematic stations (even for symmetric !).
- Simple incentives helps a lot : $2^{-C/2}$.
- Optimal regulation rate is function of capacity : 1/C.

Current and future work

- Building a realistic model of Paris (using traces).
- Analyze transient and steady-state behavior.
- Difference effect of flows vs random perturbations.
- Develop model to approximate the influence of geometry.